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STA TE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Rukaj, Gjelosh Facility: Otisville CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 98-A-3155 
Appeal · 
ll-053-18B-
Control No.: 
Appearances: Steven Zeidman, Esq. 
CUNY School of Law 
2 Court Square West 
Long Island City, New York 11101 
Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 
months. 
Board Member(s) Alexander, Drake, Davis 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received March 13, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Fin.dings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The /dersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: · 
-~-Affiffirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ 
1 
/-Vacated, remanded for de novo lnte<View _Modified to 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Fin~ings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sepa te 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ..,,..·~··....., .. ~ ........... _...="""'-
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 12-month hold. 
Appellant is serving an aggregate indeterminate term of imprisonment of 20 years to Life 
after having been convicted of the crimes of Murder 2nd, CPW 2nd, and Assault 2nd.  Appellant shot 
his two victims multiple times causing their deaths. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious and irrational, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and relied too heavily 
upon the serious nature of Appellant’s multiple crimes of conviction; (2) Appellant’s 
programming, positive accomplishments, rehabilitative efforts, letters of support, remorse, and 
certain COMPAS scores were not given sufficient consideration by the Board; (3) the Board’s 
decision was conclusory and lacked sufficient detail; (4) the Board should not have considered 
community opposition and Appellant is entitled to confidential letters of opposition; (5) certain 
issues were not discussed during the interview; (6) the Board’s decision was made in violation of 
Appellant’s due process rights; (7) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a resentencing of 
Appellant; (8) the Board’s decision was predetermined; and (9) the transcript of the interview was 
not accurate.  
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Rukaj, Gjelosh DIN: 98-A-3155
Facility: Otisville CF AC No.: 11-053-18 B
Findings: (Page 2 of 5)
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to insight and remorse, it 
was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of 
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Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 
777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)).  Also, the Board is permitted to conclude that the serious nature of 
the inmate’s offense, as well as limited insight and/or remorse, outweigh other factors.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000), aff’g 266 A.D.2d 296, 
297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 
(2017); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 
(2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Serrano v. N.Y. State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 
689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999). 
As to the third issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
As to the fourth issue, the Board may receive and consider written communications from 
individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an 
inmate’s release to parole supervision.  Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 
A.D.3d 1380, --N.Y.S.3d-- (3d Dept. 2018) (“Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do not find 
that [the Board’s] consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent community opposition’ to his 
parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into account 
in rendering a parole release determination”); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 
A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) (“the Board permissibly considered letters 
in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members of the 
community”); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 
N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) (recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)’s list is not the exclusive 
information the Board may consider and persons in addition to victims and their families may 
submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of Jordan v. 
Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens are 
protected and remain confidential); Matter of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & 
Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda A.J.S.C.) (recognizing “[c]onsideration 
of community or other opposition was proper under the statute” and the Board is required to keep 
identity of persons opposing release confidential), aff’d sub nom. Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 
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N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole., Index # 3699-2013, Order and Judgment dated October 25, 2013 (Devine J.S.C.)(Albany 
Co. Court)(no showing of prejudice by allegedly false information in PBA online petition where 
Board acknowledged public opposition during interview), aff’d, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
714 (3d Dept. 2014); cf. Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 
WL 2567779, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (public and political pressure “are permissible 
factors which parole officials may properly consider as they relate to ‘whether ‘release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the offense 
as to undermine respect for the law’”); Morel v. Thomas, No. 02 CV 9622 (HB), 2003 WL 
21488017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003) (same); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 
2003 WL 21744084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (same).    
            As to the fifth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
As to the sixth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence as a person's liberty interest is extinguished upon conviction. 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 
2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of 
Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State 
parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected 
liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 
N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
As to the seventh issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to 
an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to 
determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the 
factors set forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray 
v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State 
Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
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As to the eighth issue, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges 
and administrative fact-finders. See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 
A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory 
requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s 
possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence 
that the Board’s decision was predetermined. See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).   
As to the ninth issue, a corrected and final interview transcript was certified by a Registered 
Diplomate Reporter on February 21, 2019.   Given this certification, it can be fairly assumed that 
the written transcript constitutes an accurate account of the colloquy that transpired between 
Appellant and Board Members Alexander, Drake, and Davis. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
